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Abstract 
Many intelligence scandals in the news today seem unprecedented - from 
Russian meddling in the 2016 U.S. Presidential election, to British and U.S. 
intelligence agencies monitoring activities of their citizens. They seem new 
largely because, traditionally, intelligence agencies on both sides of the 
Atlantic were excessively secretive about their past activities: even the 
names “GCHQ” and “NSA” were airbrushed from declassified records, and 
thus missing from major historical works and scholarship on on post-war 
international relations. The resulting secrecy about British and U.S. 
intelligence has led to misunderstandings and conspiracy theories in societies
about them. Newly opened secret records now reveal the long history of 
many subjects seen in today’s news-cycle: Anglo-American intelligence 
cooperation, interference by countries in foreign elections, disnformation, 
and the use and abuse of intelligence by governments. Newly declassified 
records also add to our understanding of major chapters of international 
history, like Britain’s post-war end of empire. Without overcoming our 
historical amnesia disorder about U.S. and British intelligence, citizens, 
scholars and policy-makers cannot hope to understand the proper context for
what secret agencies are doing today.
Keywords 
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warfare
Societies on both sides of the Atlantic have an insatiable appetite for 
secrets: Stories about the unauthorized disclosure of secrets-leaks-
continually attract news and broadcast media attention, as do news stories 
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about intelligence agencies, whose job is to provide governments with secret
information. Since September 11, 2001, intelligence agencies and their 
secrets have hardly been out of the news headlines-from fairy-tale 
intelligence assessments made by Britain and America about Weapons of 
Mass Destruction in Iraq to disclosures about U.S. and British "mass 
surveillance" made by a former NSA contractor, Edward Snowden. Donald 
Trump’s election as U.S. president in November 2016 has only increased 
public concern about secrets, leaks, and intelligence matters, particularly 
about Trump’s alleged election connections with Russian intelligence.
Despite a rolling news commentary on intelligence matters today, 
which seem to crash onto social media almost every minute, when it comes 
to historical studies of foreign policies and international relations, intelligence
is either wholly missing or treated as an aberration, even in the best and 
most recently published accounts. For a curious student of history, for 
example, taking an undergraduate course on modern history, or simply 
reading history in his or her spare time, there is an inexplicable historical 
amnesia when it comes to intelligence. For example, George Herring's 
otherwise magisterial 1000-page volume of the Oxford History of U.S. 
Foreign Relations, From Colony to Superpower, published in a revised edition
in 2011, only once mentions the President's Daily Brief (PDB), the CIA’s 
flagship top-secret briefing, which it does in relation to 9/11.2 In reality, 
PDBs (and their predecessors) were given to all post-war U.S. presidents. 
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Some presidents, like Richard Nixon, ignored them, while others, like George
H. W. Bush, a former U.S. Director of Central Intelligence, were avid 
consumers of them. We are supposed to believe that, although governments 
use and abuse intelligence in our own times, in relation to 9/11, they did not 
do so in the past. The result is that our understanding of key historical 
periods is at best incomplete, and at worst, may be fundamentally distorted.
Filling in missing pieces of an historical jigsaw is not just something of 
academic interest, however; it also has an important public policy value. 
Continuing neglect of intelligence in major historical works actually poses a 
security threat in its own right: It throws the subject of intelligence into 
disrepute and, worse, provides space for conspiracy theories about it to 
grow. Those studying history, even at the world’s best universities, are given
little or no chance to understand what intelligence agencies are supposed to 
do-what they can and cannot do-and are therefore ill equipped to argue 
against intelligence conspiracy theories on the basis of facts they know. At a 
time when intelligence matters are highly charged issues, and when even the
existence of facts is being questioned-with Orwellian “alternative facts”-it is 
arguably more important than ever to provide facts about intelligence in the 
past. They may also provide insights about the future.3
The doyen of British spy fiction literature, John Le Carré, has 
suggested that traditionally there was something peculiar about British 
society, steeped in a strict class system and social structure, which made it 
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amenable to secrecy. Another respected writer on intelligence history, Ben 
Macintyre (2017), has suggested that Britain’s traditional social fascination 
with secrecy may be derived from British private school education, which 
cultivated privacy, secrecy, and putting on a public brave face-in other 
words, lies and deception.4 Wherever it derived from, historically the British 
government had a peculiar attitude towards intelligence not dissimilar to the 
Victorian attitude towards sex: Although it took place, it was not appropriate 
to discuss in public.
British Prime Minister Harold Wilson was typical in this regard. In his 
chapter on “The Prime Minister and National Security,” in his book The 
Governance of Britain, published in 1976, Wilson gave probably the shortest 
book chapter ever written by a British politician. It quotes approvingly Harold
Macmillan’s dictum that it is “dangerous and bad for our general national 
interest” to discuss security and intelligence matters at all, and concludes 
after less than a page: “The prime minister is occasionally questioned on 
(security) matters...His answers may be regarded as uniformly 
uninformative. There is no further information that can usefully or properly 
be added before bringing this chapter to an end” (quoted in Andrew and 
Dilks 1984, 14).5 
Although Britain’s intelligence services, MI5 and SIS (MI6), were 
established in 1909, and GCHQ (then known as GC&CS) in 1919, like Wilson,
most British prime ministers in the twentieth century did not publicly discuss 
4
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intelligence, refusing even to avow publicly the existence of Britain’s 
intelligence services. As late as the 1980s, the British government was still 
trying to maintain what by then was an open secret about the existence of 
its secret services-even though London buses routinely stopped outside 
MI5’s headquarters saying, “All off here for MI5”.6 The esteemed British 
military historian, Sir Michael Howard, who wrote one of the volumes of the 
official history of British intelligence in the Second World War, complained in 
1985: “So far as official government policy is concerned, enemy agents are 
found under gooseberry bushes and intelligence is brought by the storks.”7
In the mid-1980s, the world’s leading intelligence historian, 
Christopher Andrew, decried the “silent censorship” of British archives, 
asserting that scholars dealing with British foreign policy in the twentieth 
century were dealing with “an archive laundered by honourable men in what 
they believed to be the national interest.”8 It was only in the 1990s when the
British government finally gave up the pretence of secrecy and placed its 
intelligence services on a statutory footing. Soon afterwards it also stopped 
its silent censorship of official records, declassifying huge volumes of its 
historical intelligence records.
MI5’s Director-General, Sir Stephen Lander, who holds a Cambridge 
doctorate in History, pioneered MI5’s release of historical records in the 
1990s, turning the tables on Britain’s traditional approach to secrecy and 
intelligence. As he put it, MI5 would thereafter release as many of its 
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historical records as possible, while only retaining those that could not be 
released on grounds of national security (Lander 2002, 7–20).9 From then 
on, enemy agents were no longer found under gooseberry bushes and 
intelligence was no longer brought by storks.10
Unlike in Britain, the post-war U.S. intelligence community was placed 
on a statutory footing from the outset when it was established in 1947. 
Despite being legally recognized, U.S. intelligence agencies fared little better 
than their British counterparts at finding their way into history books. 
Similarly to their British colleagues, historians of U.S. foreign policy also 
appeared to suffer from amnesia about intelligence. Sometimes this had dire 
consequences for U.S. foreign policy. After the Bay of Pigs fiasco in 1961, 
when the CIA launched a failed invasion of Cuba to overthrow its leader, 
Fidel Castro, president John F. Kennedy, who authorized the operation, said 
that much of the problem was because he had relied on CIA "experts" who 
told him what covert action could achieve, but he did not understand its 
limits. Kennedy was unable to argue against the exaggerated beliefs about 
covert action in Cuba emerging from CIA’s Directorate of Operations 
because, unlike other areas of foreign policy, he lacked a conceptual 
framework-and knowledge-about how covert action worked. How could JFK 
have known, when the history books he was devouring while in office were 
silent about intelligence? (Andrew 1995, 257).11
Since JFK’s time, the situation has not got much better. Students at 
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Harvard’s Kennedy School in the 1990s were able to read a 20-page 
condensed history on “The CIA to 1961.”12 Those who digested these 20 
pages knew more about the CIA than Kennedy did when he became 
president. However, the overwhelming majority of studies on U.S. foreign 
policy continue to neglect the role of U.S. intelligence, just as they did in 
Kennedy’s time. At the time of writing this article, a full-text search on the 
online scholarly database JSTOR, reveals there are 29,303 results (articles, 
primary sources, and books) containing the words “U.S. foreign policy.” 
However, when these are combined with the words “National Security 
Agency,” the results plummet to just 303 listed results-approximately one 
percent of the larger total. This means that ninety-nine percent of articles, 
primary sources, and books on “U.S. foreign policy” presently listed on 
JSTOR do not expressly acknowledge that the NSA, the U.S. code-breaking 
agency founded in 1952, played any role whatsoever in U.S. foreign policy. It
does not take an advanced history degree to appreciate that something is 
missing from the existing academic literature.13
Studying the British and American “Missing Dimension” 
It has become a cliché that intelligence is the missing dimension of the
history of diplomacy and international relations in the twentieth century. 
However, like many clichés, it is based on an element of fact. Although 
intelligence may still be missing from historical scholarship, it is definitely not
7
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missing from national archives on both sides of the Atlantic. There are now 
so many declassified British and U.S. intelligence records revealing 
previously highly sensitive state secrets-with many digitized and available to 
download from archives’ websites, thus even sparing researchers travel 
costs-that it is sometimes difficult to know where to begin researching them.
Beginning in the late 1990s, the British government began to 
declassify its historic intelligence records. Unsurprisingly, it was revealed 
that Britain’s intelligence services had a history and, just as they do today, 
played a role in British government decision making in the past, for both 
good and bad. At the National Archives in London, there are now over 5,000 
declassified records of Britain’s Security Service (MI5), a treasure-trove of 
historical secrets, as well as historical records from Britain’s Joint Intelligence
Committee (JIC), Britain’s highest intelligence assessment body, as well as 
records from Britain’s wartime sabotage agency, SOE, and from the British 
code-breaking agency at Bletchley Park, GC&CS.14
One methodological problem facing anyone wanting to study the 
history of intelligence and secrets is that, like conducting any kind of 
historical enquiry, we are dependent upon the sources available to us; 
however, unlike other areas of historical research, with intelligence history 
we have to rely on the subjects under examination-intelligence services, 
whose business is to deal in secrets-to reveal their own history. This 
inevitably leads to a question about the extent to which we can trust “the 
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hand that feeds us,” or whether we are being presented merely with a 
version of the past as intelligence services want us to see it.15 
One way to alleviate the problem of relying solely on intelligence 
services to declassify their own records, but also give their activities the 
historical place they deserve, is to combine intelligence records with those of
other government departments. After all, it is the job of intelligence services 
to service other government departments with secret information, or 
intelligence, and it is therefore only natural that records from the intelligence
services should be found in the files of other departments. Large tranches of 
intelligence material can be found in records of the British Foreign Office, the
Prime Minister’s Office, and the War Office at the National Archives in 
London. Another way to obtain historical British intelligence records is to use 
the UK Freedom of Information Act 2000 (FOIA 2000). Unfortunately, FOIA 
2000 does not apply to Britain’s intelligence services themselves, but it does 
apply to other government departments.
A further way in which we can place Britain’s intelligence services in 
their proper historical context is to use records from private collections of 
papers, which have sometimes managed to avoid Whitehall record 
“weeders,” whose job it is to extract sensitive information from records being
declassified. I have found valuable intelligence material held in papers at the 
Imperial War Museum in London, or tucked away in libraries in Oxford and 
Cambridge. In addition to these sources, studying contemporary newspapers
9
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can also reveal historical activities of the British secret state when they 
bubble up into the public domain. Sometimes old newspaper reports contain 
new revelations. The Times digital archive, which is word searchable, has 
been particularly useful in this regard.
In a move that would have astonished previous guardians of the British
secret state, beginning in the early 2000s, Britain’s intelligence services 
commissioned official histories for publication, researched and written by 
outside, academic historians. Christopher Andrew’s authorized centenary 
history of MI5 was published in 2009, which the present author helped to 
research and write, over the course of six years. Keith Jeffery’s centenary 
official history of SIS (popularly known as MI6) was also published in 2009. 
Meanwhile, the official history of Britain’s intelligence assessment body, the 
JIC, is being written by Michael Goodman in several volumes, and John Ferris
has recently been appointed to write the authorized history of Britain’s 
GCHQ, which will be published on its centenary anniversary, in 2019. In a 
short period of just ten years, from the early 1990s to the early 2000s, the 
British government moved from being one of the most secretive about the 
history of its intelligence services to being one of the most transparent in the
world.16
The same methodological approach can be taken with regard to 
studying U.S. intelligence history. There is a much longer tradition of 
declassifying intelligence records in the United States than in Britain, derived
10
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from the statutory basis of U.S. intelligence, and also efforts of successive 
Congressional intelligence oversight bodies throughout the Cold War. In fact,
as the intelligence historian Richard Aldrich showed, in the 1990s it was 
often possible to obtain British intelligence records at U.S. archives when 
they were not even available in British National Archives. The U.S. National 
Archives at College Park contains enough declassified U.S. intelligence 
material to keep researchers busy for a lifetime-from records of America’s 
wartime intelligence agency, the OSS, to U.S. intelligence assessments made
about the Soviet Union in the closing stages of the Cold War. Each post-war 
U.S. presidential library also contains shelves worth (literally) of declassified 
records about how the White House used, abused, or overlooked intelligence.
For those who take intelligence seriously, there are also tranches of 
intelligence records held at university libraries-some Ivy League professors 
quietly worked for OSS during the war, and continued to work for the CIA 
during the Cold War, as revealed by the papers they left to universities. 
Stanford’s Hoover Institute has significant historical intelligence holdings-
American, British, and Russian-for researchers. U.S. intelligence agencies 
have also opened their archives to the public in a way that would have 
shocked their Cold War predecessors. This year, the CIA placed its entire 
declassified electronic historical “reading room” online: a database containing
12 million pages of declassified records, called “CREST,” previously only 
available at an awkward corner at the National Archives at College Park. The 
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FBI also has an historical “Vault” containing some of its past case files 
publicly available on its website. Equally valuable for studying previous U.S. 
government secrets are two online databases, the Declassified Documents 
Reference System and the Digital National Security Archive. In addition to all
these archival resources, the published Foreign Relations of the United 
States series contains intelligence records that its editors have selected from
various archives (Aldrich 2001).17
Rarely, entire secret archives emerge into the public domain. This 
happened when I was researching my first book, which concerned British 
intelligence, the Cold War, and Britain’s post-war end of empire. Thanks to a 
case brought to the English High Court by a group of elderly Kenyans, in 
which they claimed the British government was liable for abuses they 
suffered under British colonial rule in Kenya, the British Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office was forced to reveal the existence of 8,800 files on 
Kenya that it has previously “lost.” In fact, from the court case, it emerged 
that in the last days of empire, British colonial officials had secretly spirited 
away vast tranches of records from 37 different British colonies across the 
world, including Kenya, Cyprus, Aden, Palestine, Nigeria, and Malaya.
The official explanation for why these records were removed from 
British colonies, as the sun set on the empire, was that they might 
“embarrass” His (and then Her) Majesty’s Government. In reality, the records
were deliberately removed because they contained some of the darkest 
12
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secrets in the last days of Britain’s empire. The first cache of the previously 
“lost” records in the so-called “migrated archive,” only made available in May
2012, reveals that the British government deliberately set out destroying, 
culling, and then removing incriminating records in colonies as they 
approached independence from Britain, in order to prevent them falling into 
the hands of post-independence governments.18 By destroying and removing 
records, the British government was then able to inculcate a fictional history 
of its colonial benevolence, in which, it claimed, occasional abuses and 
violence were inflicted on local populations. But these instances of 
unpleasantness were the exception, not the rule.  The “lost” colonial office 
records now reveal such a claim as nonsense. Burying the British empire was
a far more bloody affair than previously acknowledged or supposed.
Records that were not deliberately destroyed by colonial officials in the 
last days of the British empire were transferred back to Britain, where they 
were housed at a top-secret Foreign Office facility outside London, at 
Hanslope Park in Buckinghamshire, where they remained hidden for 50 
years, until the High Court forced their release.  Hanslope Park’s official title 
is curiously neutral-sounding: “Her Majesty’s Communications Centre.” To 
local inhabitants around Hanslope Park, however, it is known as “spook 
central.” Thanks to the Kenyan court case before the High Court, the secrets 
of Hanslope Park have now finally been laid bare. The suggestion that the 
13
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British government could have “mislaid” or “lost” this archive is as shameful 
as it is preposterous. The records at Hanslope Park are stored on 15 miles of 
shelving, in a facility longer than the length of St. Paul’s cathedral in London.
We can now see that, essentially, Hanslope Park acted as a depository for 
records detailing the most shameful acts and crimes committed in the last 
days of the British empire.19
Origins of Anglo-American Intelligence Alliance
The avalanche of previously secret British and American intelligence 
records that recently has come crashing into archives has forced scholars to 
revise our understanding of important historical events. This is the case with 
the origins of intelligence relations between Britain and America-the closest 
intelligence relationship between two countries in history. Much ink has been
devoted to the so-called “special” Anglo-American relationship, with secret 
intelligence often correctly described as the closest part of the relationship 
between the two countries throughout the Cold War, to the present day. 
Britain’s GCHQ and America’s NSA are today so closely connected that some 
of their operating systems are, for practical purposes, interconnected. In the 
event of a catastrophic system failure, NSA would rely on GCHQ to take over
its operations-something unique among even close intelligence allies. One 
former NSA Director, Michael Hayden (2016), has described that the origins 
of this unique intelligence relationship stretches back to Anglo-American 
14
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wartime code-breaking cooperation at Britain’s famous Bletchley Park (41-
2).20 
Churchill played a significant role in fostering British and American 
intelligence cooperation at Bletchley Park, and then, in his various writings 
after the Second World War, popularized the idea of the “special relationship”
between the two countries. Churchill’s writings have coloured much of the 
subsequent literature on Anglo-American relations, which is often infused 
with sentimentality rather than grounded in historical facts. When we 
examine recently declassified British intelligence records, the picture that 
emerges about the origins of Anglo-American intelligence relations is far less 
rosy than Churchill’s (1956) later description. In fact, intelligence sharing 
between the two countries was not derived from shared lofty ideals-a 
civilising mission by the “English-speaking peoples,” as Churchill later 
described it (Churchill 1956)-but instead driven by cold-hearted pragmatism 
in which one ally, Britain, was even prepared to deceive the other to get it 
into the war.21
The rest of this article is the first analysis, based on newly declassified 
British intelligence records, to study the uneasy early history of Anglo-
American intelligence relations. Understanding this period has implications 
for appreciating later Anglo-American intelligence, during both the Second 
World War and the Cold War. As we shall see, studying British–U.S. 
intelligence also changes our understanding about major chapters of post-
15
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war international history, such as the demise of Britain’s empire. Although it 
remains a missing dimension from almost all existing historiography, in 
reality it is impossible to understand post-war British “decolonisation,” as 
Britain’s end of empire is known, without appreciating the role of British 
intelligence-and, in turn, that of U.S. intelligence.
For over two years after the outbreak of the Second World War, Britain
fought for its survival against what appeared to be Nazi Germany’s 
unstoppable “lighting war,” Blitzkrieg, across Europe. American isolationist 
groups, such as the “America First” movement, championed by the 
charismatic American aviator and Nazi-sympathiser, Charles Lindbergh, 
objected to American involvement in a war of the “Old World.” Under 
pressure from isolationists in Congress, while Britain (supported by its 
empire) fought a war against Hitler, America officially remained neutral.
We can now see that President Franklin D. Roosevelt was secretly 
communicating with Britain’s First Lord of the Admiralty, Winston Churchill, 
soon to be British Prime Minister, about America assisting Britain’s war 
effort. However, their secret discussions about Britain and America’s secret 
wartime cooperation were nearly destroyed by a Nazi sympathiser working at
the U.S. embassy in London, Tyler Kent. Kent was a cypher clerk at the U.S. 
embassy, who strongly believed in U.S. isolationism, and was determined to 
reveal secret communications he had seen and helped to transmit between 
Roosevelt and Churchill, which, Kent believed, threatened American 
16
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neutrality. To expose what he believed was a plot being hatched between 
Roosevelt and Churchill to bring the United States into the war, in the Spring
of 1940 he amassed about 1,500 U.S. diplomatic documents, including 
cables between Roosevelt and Churchill, which Kent hid in his London 
apartment and planned to give to German sympathisers in Britain for 
publication.22 
MI5 discovered Kent’s activities from undercover agents it was running
in a far right-wing, pro-German, anti-Semitic group in Britain, the Right 
Club. One of MI5’s agents inside the Right Club, a certain Anna Wolfkoff, 
reported that Kent had been passing classified U.S. information to the head 
of the Right Club, a maverick Conservative Member of the British Parliament,
Captain Archibald Ramsay. Wolkoff reported that she had seen Ramsay with 
correspondence between a senior MI5 officer, Guy Liddell, and the Director 
of the FBI, J. Edgar Hoover, concerning secret Anglo-American cooperation 
on matters like Britain’s purchase of U.S. radio direction-finding equipment.23
In May 1940, after Churchill became Prime Minister, MI5 informed him 
about Kent’s activities. It brought the same message to the U.S. ambassador
in London, Joseph Kennedy. By no means an Anglophile, Kennedy in fact 
believed that Britain would lose the war. However, when MI5 presented him 
with evidence of Kent’s treachery, Kennedy immediately grasped the political
repercussions caused by the disclosure of Churchill and Roosevelt’s secret 
communications, which ran contrary to official U.S. policy of neutrality. The 
17
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issue was particularly charged considering that Roosevelt was running for re-
election as president and faced criticism for being too friendly with Britain. 
Kennedy was so alarmed that he took the remarkable decision to remove 
Kent’s U.S. diplomatic immunity so he could be arrested and tried in Britain, 
which was done in a specially convened court, closed to the public. Kent was 
prosecuted for breaking the British Official Secrets Act and sentenced to 
seven years imprisonment.24
The Tyler Kent case revealed how fragile Anglo-American secret 
wartime cooperation was. If Kent had done what he intended, and revealed 
the secret dealings between Roosevelt and Churchill, it would have 
strengthened the hand of American isolationists, whose influence Churchill 
was struggling to contain. It may even have cost Roosevelt his re-election as
president. After searching Kent’s apartment and finding his amassed 
collection of U.S. diplomatic documents, MI5 reported to Churchill, with 
probably a little exaggeration: “It is quite clear that some of the information 
relating to the military position of the Allies was so vital that in the event of 
its being passed to Germany, the most disastrous consequences would 
ensue.” U.S. diplomats in Washington’s Foggy Bottom were even more 
shocked: “Nothing like this has ever happened in American history,” wrote 
U.S. Assistant Secretary of State, Breckinridge Long (Andrew 2009). “It 
means not only that our codes are cracked… but that our every diplomatic 
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manoeuver was exposed to Germany and Russia [at the time allies]… It is a 
terrible blow-almost a major catastrophe” (226).25
British Fake News and Deception Against America
In 1941, Churchill and Roosevelt’s secret communications came to 
fruition when the United States, still not in the war, began to provide Britain 
with vitally needed supplies. America became the “arsenal of democracy,” as
Roosevelt phrased it, providing Britain with war materiel through a program 
known as “Lend-Lease.” American warships and planes patrolled Atlantic 
convoys, guarding ships packed with millions of tons of American products-a 
tenuous lifeline for Britain fighting on its own in Europe.
British intelligence played an important role in secret backchannel 
communications between the two governments before the United States 
entered the war. Britain’s intelligence liaison with the Roosevelt 
administration was run by a deliberately blandly named outfit, British 
Security Coordination (BSC), based on the forty-fourth floor of New York’s 
Rockefeller Center. In fact, BSC was home to Britain’s spies in the United 
States: It housed the SIS (MI6) station in America. BSC was run by a 
wealthy Canadian businessman with long-standing connections with SIS, Sir 
William Stephenson. He soon became close friends with Roosevelt’s 
decorated wartime intelligence chief, William J. Donovan, who at the time 
was Roosevelt’s Coordinator of Information and, after America’s entry into 
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the war, would become head of Roosevelt’s Office of Strategic Services, 
which itself laid the basis for the Central Intelligence Agency, established in 
1947.
Donovan and Stephenson were kindred spirits. Self-made wealthy 
men, internationalist in outlook, and both combat heroes of the First World 
War. Stephenson referred to the larger-than-life Donovan as “Big Bill,” and 
Donovan affectionately labeled the smaller and trimmer Stephenson as 
“Little Bill.” Despite the goodwill between the two men, Stephenson was less 
forthcoming about some matters with Donovan-and the Roosevelt 
administration-than he appeared. Later, a senior OSS officer posted in 
London to liaise with British intelligence correctly remarked: “The British 
taught us everything we knew but not everything they knew” (Walton 2013, 
121).26
Churchill believed that America would inevitably join the war but 
needed prodding to do so. To help prod America in the direction of the war, 
from its BSC headquarters in New York, SIS orchestrated a secret 
propaganda campaign to promote pro-British war stories in the U.S. press 
and blacken the public reputation of American isolationists. Britain deployed 
some of the same black arts of covert propaganda against America as it used
against the Axis Powers. BSC employed a number of British authors to write 
pro-British press stories in America, as well as leak pro-British news. BSC’s 
authors included a young Roald Dahl. The most striking piece of 
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disinformation-what we may legitimately term fake news-that William 
Stevenson’s BSC passed to Roosevelt’s administration concerned alleged 
Nazi plans for South America.
BSC forged documents purportedly from the Bolivian military attaché 
in Berlin about Nazi plans for establishing a Nazi dictatorship in South 
America. Stephenson gave this forged letter-including a map vividly showing 
Nazi hegemony there-to Roosevelt, who used it in one of his famous “fireside
chat” radio broadcasts on September 11, 1941, to denounce Nazi plans for 
Latin America.27 Some officials in Roosevelt’s administration seem to have 
smelled a British rat, guessing that they were been deceived by British 
intelligence over this letter. They did not convince the president, however. 
Even if he suspected he was being deceived, Roosevelt apparently did not 
care: The British documents suited Roosevelt’s own political purposes 
against American isolationists.28 This episode confirms an old adage in 
intelligence work: There is no such thing as a friendly secret service, only the
secret service of a friendly country. 
Secrets of Britain’s End of Empire
After America’s entry into the war, Britain and America went on to 
share more secrets than any two independent states in history. As is now 
commonly known, the centerpiece of Britain and America’s unprecedented 
wartime intelligence sharing was signals intelligence (SIGINT). Almost every 
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history of the Second World War now acknowledges the astonishing work of 
British and American code-breakers at Bletchley Park, who successfully broke
the German ENIGMA code. However, when we look at the history of the post-
war years-the Cold War-the vast majority of history books fail to mention 
British and U.S. SIGINT efforts. John Gaddis’ otherwise outstanding study, 
The Cold War (2005), does not mention GCHQ once. We are supposed to 
believe that British and U.S. codebreakers stopped work in 1945. In fact, 
they continued to work together in the post-war years just as they had 
during the war.
We can now see that the British and U.S. governments signed a 
SIGINT-sharing alliance in March 1946, known as the UKUSA agreement. The
agreement was not a single document, as previously thought, but a series of 
agreements, with revisions made in 1948 and then periodically in the early 
1950s. It codified the close SIGINT collaboration established between the 
British and U.S. governments during the war, which had been organised 
through a previous treaty known as BRUSA.
The post-war UKUSA agreement became the fulcrum for the 
intelligence “special relationship” between Britain and America throughout 
the Cold War. The text of the first UKUSA agreement, which was only 
declassified in 2010 because it was considered too sensitive to release before
then, makes clear that the British empire and Commonwealth played a key 
role in the treaty between London and Washington. A GCHQ outfit known as 
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the London Signals Intelligence Board, representing the British government 
at the negotiations in March 1947, bargained hard for Britain to have 
responsibility for SIGINT collection everywhere within the British empire, 
while the U.S. government would be responsible for all other countries. The 
British delegation argued that countries gaining independence from Britain 
but remaining within the Commonwealth as “Dominions” should not be 
considered “third parties” and therefore outside Britain’s SIGINT realm. The 
subtext for this was Britain’s looming transfer of power in India.29
By reserving for itself the right to collect SIGINT in colonies gaining 
Dominion status, the British government managed to solidify its intelligence 
position in the post-war world, throughout the Cold War, and punch far 
above its weight as far as Washington was concerned. When India and 
Pakistan achieved independence in 1947, they both gained what the authors 
of the UKUSA agreement called “Dominion status,” though this was soon 
rechristened “Commonwealth status” in a bid to make it sound less 
antiquated and patronising. The UKUSA agreement meant that Britain and its
colonies were too important for Washington to ignore. An important role in 
brokering the agreement for the British government was played by Harry 
Hinsley, then a young cryptanalyst who had worked at Bletchley Park, and 
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With GCHQ having secured the right to collect SIGINT in countries 
entering the Commonwealth, it thereafter became a recurrent theme in the 
special relationship between London and Washington that the U.S. 
government needed the vestiges of Britain’s empire for intelligence collection,
despite Washington’s obvious long history of anti-colonialism. The UKUSA 
agreement guaranteed London’s special status in the eyes of Washington, 
even as Britain’s formal imperial power and military “hard power” influence 
decreased. In the 1950s and 1960s, in the pre-satellite era, when a great 
deal of communications were passed over long distances using high-
frequency radio, Britain’s remnants of empire performed an essential role by 
providing ground stations to collect those signals. In fact, in order to collect 
SIGINT, we can now see that Washington actually took over and bankrolled 
Britain’s continued presence in some of its former colonial outposts, well after
they gained independence. This confirms a thesis put forward by two 
influential historians of the British empire, Wm. Roger Louis and Ronald 
Robinson, in an article in 1994: As Washington took over parts of Britain’s 
declining empire during the Cold War, there was effectively an “imperialism 
of decolonization” (Louis and Robinson 462–511). On the basis of the UKUSA 
agreement, Britain’s outposts of empire thus became as important to 
Washington for SIGINT collection as they had been for the British 
government itself.30
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The UKUSA agreement was revised in 1948 and the early 1950s to 
incorporate Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, which divided the world into
different SIGINT collection spheres, as covered by each signatory’s listening 
posts, presided over by Washington and London. This SIGINT collection and 
sharing agreement became known as the “Five Eyes” agreement, persisting 
to the present day. As Britain’s formal empire began to break up, it made 
huge efforts to secure strategic treaties allowing for a lasting British (and by 
extension, American) presence in newly independent countries.
Britain’s old imperial bases, dotting the globe from Cyprus to 
Singapore, became new homes to enormous SIGINT collection centres. In 
the 1950s, Cyprus became a massive British SIGINT collection camp, with 
aerials and antennae springing up across the small island, many of them 
directly funded by the U.S. government’s new SIGINT agency, the NSA. In 
December 1963, when British Prime Minister Sir Alec Douglas-Home asked 
whether Britain really needed to retain bases in Cyprus, the Defence 
Secretary, Peter Thorneycroft, replied with an emphatic “yes,” stating that 
the island “houses the most important SIGINT stations and it also provided a 
base from which special reconnaissance flight are carried out” (Walton 2013, 
315).31
Conclusion
Despite an historical amnesia shown by the overwhelming majority of 
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British and U.S. foreign policy historians about intelligence, recently 
declassified British and U.S. intelligence records are changing our 
understanding about major historical events. As I have shown elsewhere, 
this is the case with the end of the British empire-the largest empire in world
history (Walton 2013 xxi).32 This is also the case with the origins of the 
Anglo-American intelligence alliance, which was far less comfortable than the
image of the “special relationship” later popularized by Churchill would 
suggest. More than just correcting historical amnesia, however, declassified 
British and U.S. intelligence records also reveal subjects with striking 
overtones for the secret world today.
The wartime documents forged by British intelligence and given to 
President Roosevelt show there is nothing new about intelligence services-
even those of friendly states-peddling fake news. Given the volume of British
and U.S. intelligence material now publicly available, with much of it 
accessible by just a few clicks of a mouse from anywhere in the world, 
historians of British and U.S. foreign policies who have previously ignored 
intelligence now have two choices: either to start to incorporate intelligence 
into their work, or to explain why they have chosen not to do so. The latter 
is not a tenable option.33
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